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By Admin, December 15, 2007 10:38

Hot:

Finally, a “critical” Java runtime update from Apple by ZDNet‘s Ryan Naraine — Apple has shipped a long-overdue Java runtime update to plug at least 30 vulnerabilities that expose Mac OS X users to remote code execution attacks.

This article really only highlights the issue. Quicktime has (and still has) many bugs so many that I’d simply deem it the ‘Buggiest and Most Insecure Application of ALL TIME’. Anyone who uses Quicktime should REMOVE IT immediately, and then clean there system. I’d even recommend cleaning the registry of any APPLE or QUICKTIME entries, something I’m typically loathe to do under any circumstances. Apple simply seems to not understand the security climate in todays world, or doesn’t care about it’s users. Either way it’s reprehensible that they are doing so well in the technology markets without putting security first.

Apple could learn a lot from Microsoft on this, but I’m not saying Microsoft’s approach is superior, I’m just saying it’s actually far more committed to keeping it’s user base informed. Apple seems to prefer just keeping us in the dark, or to use an alliteration, they prefer to keep the apples on the tree so they don’t bonk someone on the head and perhaps wake them up to reality. Apple’s products and OS is really insecure! This is like many ignorant companies that seem to think if ‘we have a security breach, we keep it secret’, and this is the approach I find criminal. I for one am lobbying governments to change this, and FORCE ANYONE with sensitive data or source code to proprietary OS’s to FULLY DISCLOSE vulnerabilities to reduce ones exposure to 0-day attacks.

It took Apple 6 months (!!!!) to come up with the latest patch, and it didn’t fix all of them, actually of the 30 it claimed, only 18 are TRULY fixed. I’d call it lying…I don’t mix my fruit up.’

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By Admin, December 12, 2007 08:51

Hot:

I recently came across an article from ‘Information Security’ that reviewed several “Enterprise” class security suites. I have reviewed several here on this blog in the past year and have found very disappointing results. There have been a couple of new comer’s to the land of the personal desktop namely ‘Blink’ by eEye that I have been testing for several months. The tool isn’t ready for personal use, but it’s professional version has been commended for a while. This article compared Blink’s Enterprise tool (at time of writing I haven’t been able to confirm the differences between Pro and Enterprise).

For most readers of this blog, they may dismiss reviews of enterprise class applications but I decided to include it since for most of these vendors the Enterprise version represents the ‘best of the best’ of their offerings. As this review compares all the top providers including Symantec, CA, Trend Micro, ISS, eEye and a few others I decided it was worth while comparing them.

The article can be found here:

(I included the print-friendly version of the article as it is a 15 page review, and 15 pages is ridiculous since every page is barely a screenful on my PC, I prefer reading to clicking links and waiting for advertising to load so…)

A lot of these offerings are strictly for Windows machines, very few have linux offerings or Mac. Something to keep in mind if your network has blended OS’s you will have to seek other options for a network wide protection. However if your network is mostly Windows bases these products will meet your needs.

The offerings were presented and reviewed by many criteria, such as ‘ease of information gathering’ to usage, to malware detection capability.

The most interesting note to this is that NONE of the products had 100% detection. NONE! The best came in around 92% detection.

It’s also important to note that some were plainly incompetent at detecting malware that was present and moving around a machine. This too was a interesting consequence of the article.

Here is the features offered in the product.

The real nice extra feature that only two of the above offer is vulnerability scanning. This is a must to ensure your machines are patched and up to date. However the features can be very valuable in a work environment that can have strict policies, in a home environment its benefits will be less. My experience shows that they typically have inaccurate results so being able to use this as a guideline rather than a definitive state is important. Its still very valuable.

Since we like Blink, it’s also important to note that even the Personal version of their product offers all these features, most of the other vendors are not so accommodating for their lower end versions of the product.

So this review does in fact support our arguments regarding malware. There is NO 100% effective solution, so a multi-tiered approach to malware is wise.

It also proves our case about not relying on a traditional antivirus product alone. This type of product has pretty much no life in todays market. A blended product is what is required which most of these provide. It’s unfortunate that most of these companies cannot improve their offering to be more effective.

Additionally it’s important to note that ‘false positives’ are the #1 problem with most of these packages so it’s critical to compare ‘detection results’ with other products before making a decision to buy. As a lot of spyware vendors like to do with their product offerings is to have LARGE numbers of detection, regardless of it’s importance or even accuracy.

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By Admin, November 9, 2007 12:53

Hot:

Really? A FREE YEAR of Broadband?!? Nobody gives away a free year…

Recently I’ve received copies of a Phishing Attempt that looks like it’s from Shaw (a cable/internet/telephone service company in Canada). This phishing attempt is congruous to the Ebay and banking phishes of the recent past, in that it actually does NOT resemble a ‘real’ email, rather a fictional email to get people excited, in this case instead of warning the user it attempts a positive reaction from “getting free internet for a year”. Whoopie! A years worth of internet from Shaw isn’t that expensive. Phishing attempts are typically NOT viral or malware orientated but certainly can and do use such methods. In this case it looks like a standard email spam sent via exploited web sites.

This is a sophisticated method. It uses a similar style as Shaw uses in their correspondence and uses a legit; if inappropriate, email address. The email was generated and sent using multiple methods so tracking it will be harder to accomplish. Additionally, I shall show the details of the spam and my analysis. Our whois data will be included in the rest of the article.

First off, I will advise of the RED FLAGS in this phishing attempt

#1- “A Free Year of Broadband” – This doesn’t make sense. Shaw has trademarks and service marks that it would use to advertise it’s broadband internet service. Only someone ignorant of Shaw’s trademarks would say this. It’s really unlikely anyone who really works for Shaw would make this error.

#2 – Canadian Law states that any ‘contest’ or ‘giveaways’ contain details of said event. In most cases it’s prudent to disclaim whether or not the contest is allowed in Quebec, since the law is vastly different, and Quebec law generally does NOT allow this type of Contest. (disclaimer: I’m in no way a lawyer, but I am aware of consumer rights.). Missing the disclaimer is a definite flag

#3 – The email that is seen in the From: header is not a normal Shaw correspondence email account.

#4 – The link clearly shows a ‘secure’ link, but in no way is it going to a ‘secure’ site.

#5 – Typical email headers (on email from Shaw) missing

So just upon a quick review of this email we can deduce that it’s not a valid email. To get more pertinent details I’ll analyze these email in detail. I won’t paste the email headers in entirety, any ambiguity will be displayed by ‘XXXXXXXX’, to avoid email harvesting, but I will show you what details were more noteworthy.

The return-path was interesting. One was:

apache@utel16.besthosting.com.ua

, the other one was:

nobody@omega.omc.net

This would indicate to me that the web server sent this email, and in typical hosting fashion, it would be doing so via script on one of the hosts or virtual hosts on the system.

None of the received headers would indicate anything unexpected here, “omega” even has SSL/TLS

enabled but verify set to no.

The header in one of the emails is very interesting:

Date: Thu, 08 Nov 2007 20:49:28 +0200

From: “Shaw Communications Inc.” service@shaw.ca

Subject: Win a year of free broadband

To: XXXXXXX@shaw.ca

Reply-to: service@shaw.ca

Message-id: XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX@utel16.besthosting.com.ua

MIME-version: 1.0

Content-type: text/html

X-PHP-Script: 213.186.117.120/~loveterra/indexzz.php for 82.208.212.146

Date and time indicates a East European Time zone. I know Shaw doesn’t have any servers in Europe…

The X-PHP-Script header shows a very interesting detail of where this email came from. We’ll come back to this IP in a bit. But this is a key indicator of an exploited web site on a hosting company or something similar. This IP definitely hosts a web server, and with the above mentioned user account, but at time of checking this link generated a error.

The for address 82.208.212.146 is interesting as it resolves to:

whois -h whois.geektools.com 82.208.212.146 …

GeekTools Whois Proxy v5.0.4 Ready.

Final results obtained from whois.ripe.net.

Results:

% This is the RIPE Whois query server #1.

% The objects are in RPSL format.

%

% Rights restricted by copyright.

% See http://www.ripe.net/db/copyright.html

% Note: This output has been filtered.

% To receive output for a database update, use the “-B” flag.

% Information related to ’82.208.212.0 – 82.208.212.255′

inetnum: 82.208.212.0 – 82.208.212.255

netname: ITSOLUTIONSNET

descr: ITSolutions, Obrenoviceva 124 4/10

descr: 18000 Nis

descr: Serbia and Montenegro

country: CS

admin-c: IS1188-RIPE

tech-c: AZ919-RIPE

status: ASSIGNED PA

mnt-by: PTTSRBIJANET-MNT

source: RIPE # Filtered

person: Ivan Stankovic

address: ITSolutions

address: YU

e-mail: i.stankovic@my-its.net

phone: +38118512796

fax-no: +38118512797

nic-hdl: IS1188-RIPE

source: RIPE # Filtered

person: Aleksandar Zakic

address: ITSolutions NET

address: CS

e-mail: a.zakic@my-its.net

phone: +381-63-222-361

fax-no: +381-18-512-797

nic-hdl: AZ919-RIPE

source: RIPE # Filtered

% Information related to ’82.208.192.0/19AS13091′

route: 82.208.192.0/19

descr: JP PTT Srbija

descr: PTT Srbija Net

origin: AS13091

mnt-by: PTTSRBIJANET-MNT

source: RIPE # Filtered

Results brought to you by the GeekTools WHOIS Proxy

Server results may be copyrighted and are used with permission.

Reviewing the other IP address of the X-PHP-Header gives us this info:

whois -h whois.geektools.com 213.186.117.120 …

GeekTools Whois Proxy v5.0.4 Ready.

Final results obtained from whois.ripe.net.

Results:

% This is the RIPE Whois query server #3.

% The objects are in RPSL format.

%

% Rights restricted by copyright.

% See http://www.ripe.net/db/copyright.html

% Note: This output has been filtered.

% To receive output for a database update, use the “-B” flag.

% Information related to ’213.186.117.0 – 213.186.117.143′

inetnum: 213.186.117.0 – 213.186.117.143

netname: UTEL-DC5

descr: Utel DataCenter networks. Colocation

country: UA

admin-c: UNOC-RIPE

tech-c: UNOC-RIPE

status: ASSIGNED PA

mnt-by: AS6877-MNT

remarks: INFRA-AW

source: RIPE # Filtered

role: Utel NOC

address: 101, Volodymyrska str.

address: 01033, Kyiv, Ukraine

phone: +380 44 2359001

fax-no: +380 44 2304560

e-mail: noc@utel.net.ua

admin-c: OLE-RIPE

tech-c: BES100-RIPE

tech-c: OLE-RIPE

tech-c: JIM-RIPE

tech-c: ALT-RIPE

tech-c: UHM-RIPE

nic-hdl: UNOC-RIPE

mnt-by: AS6877-MNT

source: RIPE # Filtered

% Information related to ’213.186.112.0/20AS16124′

route: 213.186.112.0/20

descr: Utel DataCenter, Ukraine

origin: AS16124

mnt-by: AS6877-MNT

source: RIPE # Filtered

Results brought to you by the GeekTools WHOIS Proxy

Server results may be copyrighted and are used with permission.

So, it looks like someone possibly in Serbia and Montenegro, ran a cross site script residing on a server in the Ukraine, against utel16.besthosting.com.ua which sent the email. One would actually have to test this out, which I have not done to confirm this. This is a dangerous step I decided to avoid for brevity.

[page_break]

Looking at another similar email we see:

Date: Tue, 06 Nov 2007 23:24:54 +0100 (CET)

From: “Shaw Communications Inc.”

Subject: Win a year of free broadband

To: XXXXXXXXX@shaw.ca

Reply-to: service@shaw.ca

Message-id:

MIME-version: 1.0

Content-type: text/html

X-Authentication-warning: omega.omc.net: Host localhost.omc.net (127.0.0.1)

claimed to be omega.omc.net

But we can see the authentication warning from this server. No detail unfortunately.

Regardless, the viewable content of these two emails is identical, including an ‘offical’ Shaw footer to further reinforce it’s legitimacy, but it’s futile. These are NOT from SHAW.

The content included in plaintext: However to ensure not even ‘google’ browses the evil link from our site I have sanitized it so it breaks. Details to fix will be below the actual email content:

Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

209.85.15.18 is the address removed above with “Removed.example.com”. This address resolves to:

11/09/07 14:19:19 whois 209.85.15.18@whois.geektools.com

whois -h whois.geektools.com 209.85.15.18 …

GeekTools Whois Proxy v5.0.4 Ready.

Final results obtained from whois.arin.net.

Results:

OrgName: Everyones Internet

OrgID: EVRY

Address: 390 Benmar

Address: Suite 200

City: Houston

StateProv: TX

PostalCode: 77060

Country: US

ReferralServer: rwhois://rwhois.ev1servers.net:4321/

NetRange: 209.85.0.0 – 209.85.127.255

CIDR: 209.85.0.0/17

NetName: EVRY-BLK-15

NetHandle: NET-209-85-0-0-1

Parent: NET-209-0-0-0-0

NetType: Direct Allocation

NameServer: NS1.EV1SERVERS.NET

NameServer: NS2.EV1SERVERS.NET

Comment:

RegDate: 2005-12-14

Updated: 2006-11-28

RAbuseHandle: ABUSE477-ARIN

RAbuseName: Abuse Department

RAbusePhone: +1-713-579-2850

RAbuseEmail: abuse@ev1servers.net

RNOCHandle: NOC1445-ARIN

RNOCName: Noc

RNOCPhone: +1-713-579-2850

RNOCEmail: noc@ev1servers.net

OrgAbuseHandle: ABUSE271-ARIN

OrgAbuseName: Abuse

OrgAbusePhone: +1-214-782-7802

OrgAbuseEmail: abuse@theplanet.com

OrgNOCHandle: NOC1445-ARIN

OrgNOCName: Noc

OrgNOCPhone: +1-713-579-2850

OrgNOCEmail: noc@ev1servers.net

OrgTechHandle: VST3-ARIN

OrgTechName: Stinson, Valarie

OrgTechPhone: +1-713-579-2850

OrgTechEmail: admin2@ev1servers.net

# ARIN WHOIS database, last updated 2007-11-08 19:10

# Enter ? for additional hints on searching ARIN’s WHOIS database.

At this point this site seems to be up. Anyone receiving any email similar to this should simply delete it.

If you think it really is legit, call Shaw directly and ask them BEFORE you click on the link. I feel this analysis is accurate and is limited in it’s conclusions. However I hope it serves to help or assist any other who seeks to eliminate phishers, and other scammers.